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Smart card transaction times will increase as the number of bits used in the algorithms 
protecting the cards to ensure security increases. This is a potential problem for the 
Department of Defense, which requires smart card usage for its employees. This paper 
defines, compares, and contrasts two algorithms: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and then provides test data for encryption algorithms 
tested on particular certification key processes in an attempt to show that the ECC 
encryption algorithm provides the security necessary for smart card operations at a fast 
enough speed to benefit smart card users. It describes the Open Protocol for Access 
Control Identification and Ticketing with privacY (OPACITY) pilot project that took 
place over 2014 in relation to the card testing, and hypothesizes the risks and mitigation 
factors for the Department of Defense to permanently switch to the ECC algorithm for 
smart card use.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Smart cards used by Department of Defense (DOD) employees anticipate key 
length changes that make the performance time of smart cards untenable to users and card 
issuers in the future, based on the requirement that they be “strongly resistant to identity 
fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation” per Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 12 (DHS, 2004).  
B. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The CAC (Common Access Card), the smart card used for standard identification 
and physical security access for thousands of DOD personnel, is set to undergo some 
changes due to higher security concerns. The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm 
currently in use by the DOD is secure for now, but in the future, without significant key 
size increases, there is a risk of attack by hackers looking to gain access to information on 
the card. In comparison, the Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithm has been 
identified as a more secure and faster way of encrypting certificates with a lower bit size 
than the RSA algorithm.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends that in 
order to protect a symmetric key of 128 bits (Secret information as classified by NIST), 
the RSA key must be at least 3072 bits long to deter attackers, and this rate exponentially 
increases as the symmetric key size increases (The case for elliptic curve cryptography 
[The case], 2009). For Top Secret information, the number of bits required for RSA 
encryption (256 bits) is almost 30 times that of the (ECC) encryption algorithm (The 
case, 2009). This creates a situation where performance suffers as the size of the 
symmetric keys increase. The RSA algorithm size required to thwart would-be attackers 
is large enough to affect the speed of the transaction, which in turn would affect 
thousands of DOD workers. Closely related to the key size of different public key 
systems is the channel overhead required to perform key exchanges and digital signatures 
on a communications link (The case, 2009).  The key size for the transaction is identical 
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to the number of bits being transferred. This scenario could have serious national security 
consequences for the war fighter who needs secure efficient and fast communication 
transfers.  
The DOD launched a pilot program during the summer of 2014 using OPACITY 
software in conjunction with the ECC algorithm on mobile devices. Smart cards that use 
the ECC algorithm are now available to test performance measures with.  This paper 
analyzes the performance of 14 standard encryption algorithms, including RSA and ECC, 
to compare and contrast the encryption timing of each using both contact and contactless 
connections, in hopes of providing physical evidence that, for the same level of security, 
ECC is the better algorithm to use. With data evidence, it will be possible to make a 
formal recommendation that DOD smart cards be migrated from using the RSA 
algorithm to the ECC algorithm.  
This paper will define the ECC algorithm and compare the number of bits 
required for effective and efficient security to the currently used RSA algorithm. A case 
study focusing on OPACITY software will be described, and testing will be conducted on 
smart cards. Testing for this thesis will include taking a measure of on-card performance 
of 14 encryption algorithms, differentiated by both algorithm and bytes, and measured in 
groups by iteration. Additionally, more comprehensive testing of end-to-end ECC 
performance across DOD networks will be included, recording comparisons of 
performance between contact readers, desktop contactless readers, and mobile NFC 
devices. Standard deviations will be calculated to identify any data collected that falls 
outside the norm. Graphs will be designed to display the different algorithms and their 
performance compared to the others. Lastly, a potential DOD move from RSA to ECC 
algorithms will be analyzed for risk and mitigating factors. The following outline briefly 
describes each chapter of the thesis. 
1. Comparative Analysis of ECC versus RSA Algorithms  
The ECC cryptography algorithm requires significantly fewer bits to protect the 
same sized symmetric key as the RSA cryptography algorithm. The second chapter of 
this thesis will contrast and compare in laymen’s terms the ECC and RSA cryptography 
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algorithms, focusing on the improvements that can be made by implementing ECC on the 
smart card.  
2. Open Protocol for Access Control Identification and Ticketing with 
privacY Case Study 
The third chapter will highlight a case study being tested at the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Seaside, CA, focusing on Open Protocol for Access 
Control Identification and Ticketing with privacY (OPACITY), a protocol created for 
secure contactless communications using smart cards. The underlying technology will be 
stipulated but real-world data will be provided to illustrate the functionalities of the 
protocol enabling secure digitally signed and encrypted emails using Near Field 
Communication (NFC) contactless smart cards. Providing secure communications over 
mobile phone technologies is a high-level initiative for the DOD across the board as it 
will enable vetted defense users to communicate with one another using Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) technology on their smart phones in a secure, reliable, and timely 
manner. 
3. Card Testing and Algorithm Performance Comparison 
The fourth chapter will delve into the meat of the thesis, describing a java 
program written to test DOD CAC cards that have ECC algorithms implemented. Test 
data will be analyzed for performance measurements such as average key generation 
times and key generation probability distributions to compare RSA results with the ECC 
results now available in this research. The top three categories of this testing are signing 
digital certificates, encrypting and decrypting messages.  
4. Risk and Mitigation Analysis for Move from RSA to ECC Algorithm 
The last chapter will provide updated requirements and deadlines across the DOD 
for the latest encryption and mobile technology standards. Risks and possible risk 
mitigation will be discussed for the DOD migration from RSA technology to ECC 
technology, as all currently issued CAC cards would need to be re-issued with the new 
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CAC hardware. This migration will likely be slow and difficult so the goal will be to 
minimize the impact of changes on users. 
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II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ECC  
VERSUS RSA ALGORITHM 
A. PROBLEMS OF THE RIVEST-SHAMIR-ADLEMAN CRYPTOGRAPHIC 
ALGORITHM 
Smart cards—mini computer systems—are being used around the world today to 
complete millions of transactions, including transaction types such as identification, 
financial (electronic wallets), transport, and even application processing. There is 
increased need for security as sensitive military, commercial and private data increasingly 
becomes transmitted wirelessly…which translates into more sophisticated encryption 
algorithms which add to additional hardware, power and time requirements (Owor, 
Dajani, Okonkwo, & Hamilton, 2007).  Digital signatures and encryption are the two 
most important uses of smart cards within the DOD, which enables the cards to be 
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards per the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). The PIV standards laid out in Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) 201 set requirements for federal employees and contractors accessing 
information systems (Department of Commerce, 2013). 
Smart cards within the DOD are primarily used as security tokens to establish 
proof of identity, through verification of certifications stored on the smart card using 
encryption algorithms. Every cryptosystem relies upon what is hoped to be an unsolvable 
mathematical problem, and this is the encryption algorithm that is used. It is imperative 
that encryption algorithms do not add an overbearing cost in terms of time, power and 
weight to the design of these systems (Owor et al., 2007). A public key infrastructure 
(PKI) issues encrypted digital certificates to users which are stored on the smart card 
itself, and a pair of asymmetric keys are generated by an encryption algorithm every time 
the certificates need to be accessed. An asymmetric key pair is used since it establishes a 
pair for every user needed on the smart card rather than multiple pairs of key sets like a 
symmetric key. The encryption algorithm should provide the highest possible level of 
encryption security at the lowest possible cost in terms of the size of the encryption key, 
the number of operations and the unit time of encryption (Owor et al., 2007). The length 
 5 
of a key, in bits, for a conventional encryption algorithm is a common measure of 
security (The case, 2009). 
Currently, the RSA cryptographic algorithm is being used to verify identity 
certifications on smart cards for the DOD. This algorithm was one of the first widely 
accepted secure methods of private key encryption in use for data transmission. The 
premise of the algorithm is that a public and private key is generated by the algorithm. 
The public key is generated to encrypt the data and the private key is generated to decrypt 
the data. The RSA algorithm problem rests on determining what the prime numbers being 
used are, the “factoring problem.” The product of these prime numbers plus an additional 
random value is what makes up the public key. The key set is generated by the RSA 
algorithm every time the card is accessed by the user in order to determine the identity of 
the user by verifying the encrypted digital certificate of that user.  
The key set is generated by using the following algorithm (al Hasib & Haque, 
2008):  
1. Select two large prime numbers p and q (e.g. 1024 bits each) such that p 
6=q. 
2. Compute modulus n = p.q 
3. Calculate totient, ‘(n) = (p-1).(q-1) 
4. Choose an integer (public exponent) e, 1 ¡ e ¡ ‘(n), such that gcd(e, ‘(n)) = 
1. 
5. Compute the secret exponent d, 1 ¡ d ¡ ‘(n), such that d:e _1 (mod n). 
6. The public key is (n, e) 
7. And the private key is (n, d). 
The main drawback of RSA is its efficiency, in particular for some devices with 
limited computing power such as smart cards (Nassr, Bahig, Bhery & Daoud, 2008). 
RSA keys being used in smart cards had a length of 1024 bits a few years ago. This is no 
longer recommended since a short RSA key can be discovered through security attacks 
such as a brute force attack or mathematical attack. Instead, a 2048 bit length is now used 
in CAC and PIV cards. The number of values that must be tried…with a brute force 
attack…doubles with each bit added to the key length (Owor et al., 2007), making the 
algorithm more difficult to break; however, the larger key will make the encryption and 
decryption process a little slow as it will require greater computations in key generation 
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as well as in encryption/decryption algorithm (al Hasib & Haque, 2008). The longer the 
key length required the slower the performance for the key generation. It is this decrease 
in efficiency that makes increasing the bit length of the RSA algorithm an untenable 
solution to increase the security of smart cards for users in the DOD who must access 
digital certificates repeatedly throughout the work day. 
B. BENEFITS OF THE ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM  
The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is an improvement on RSA because it uses an 
elliptic curve algorithm that reduces the amount of bits required for the same level of 
security. This is becoming increasingly important due to the higher level of threats from 
hacking technologies. Gupta stated that an Elliptical curve may be defined as an equation 
of the form ay2 + bxy = cx3 + dx2 + ex + f, where a, b, c, d, e, f, x and y are for 
cryptographic purposes restricted to each belong to a finite field i.e., a, b, c, d, e, f, x and 
y are each chosen from a distinct set of integral values as cited in Owor et al., 2007. The 
ECC relies upon the difficulty of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
(ECDLP) (Owor et al., 2007) as its unsolvable mathematical problem. NIST has 
published the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), (FIPS 186–4), which standardizes the 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and recommends fifteen sets of 
elliptic curve domain parameters to be used in ECC cryptosystems. The NSA has 
endorsed the use of ECC in its Suite B1 set of algorithms, which have been deemed 
secure for Top Secret, Secret, and Sensitive but Unclassified information. 
ECC devices “smaller key sizes result in smaller system parameters, smaller 
public-key signatures, bandwidth savings, faster implementations, lower power 
requirements, and smaller hardware processors” (Chatterjee & Gupta, 2009). The digital 
signatures created by the algorithm are smaller since they are more computationally 
efficient. They will require less overhead to transmit as well. For example, the 224 bit 
ECC key provides the same amount of security as a 2048 bit RSA key. This makes ECC 
the perfect choice for a space limited device such as the smart card where minimizing 
power and energy consumption is crucial. With ECC, the time needed to generate a key 
pair is so short that even a device with the very limited computing power of a smart card 
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can generate the key pair, provided a good random number generator is available 
(Chatterjee & Gupta, 2009). The ECC algorithm will grow in usage as information 
becomes more and more secure. Figure 1 demonstrates the difference in key sizes 
between an RSA key and an ECC key, as well as the ratio of cost of the Diffie-Hellman 





RSA & Diffie-Hellman  
Key Size (bits) 
Elliptic Curve  




80 1024 160 3:1 
112 2048 224 6:1 
128 3072 256 10:1 
192 7680 384 32:1 
256 15360 521 64:1 
Figure 1.  NIST Recommended Key Sizes and Relative Computation Costs.  
(after “The case for elliptic curve cryptography,” 2009).  
It is important to remember that the speed of the cryptography computing process 
does take its toll in a financial sense as well, when you consider that over 1.5 million 
transactions are logged daily (US DOD CAC, 2010).  The biggest performance difference 
is when the smart card has to generate a public/private  key pair. The ECC and RSA 
Algorithm Performance Comparison (key pair generation), presented in Figure 14 in 
Section IV of this paper, showed that the RSA algorithm at 2048 bits was 46 times 
computationally slower than the ECC algorithm at the same number of bits. Each RSA 
key generation took approximately 38 seconds while each ECC key generation took less 
than one second. To translate this financially, for each key pair generation taking 
approximately 38 seconds for an employee making $30/hour would cost: 0.63 minutes 
wait time per person per transaction x $0.50/minute estimated labor cost ($30/hour).  For 
a Verifying Official(VO) working at a Real-Time Automated Personnel Identification 
System (RAPIDS) site distributing cards to a DOD employee (2 users) each RSA card 
would cost $0.32 more than an ECC card simply based on the time it takes to generate the 
key pair. If 500 cards a day are produced at a Card Issuance Facility (CIF) it would take 
five hours to generate the key process on the cards with the RSA algorithm while the 
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same number of cards with the ECC algorithm could be produced in less than 10 minutes.   
For every 500 cards issued, RSA costs will be over twice as much as ECC costs, and 
employees will not be able to produce as many cards.  This example is a fraction of actual 
card transactions occurring within the DOD, so the end total loss in wait time for DOD 
employees is not trivial.    
 9 
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III. OPACITY CASE STUDY 
A. MOBILE DEVICE SMART CARD LIMITATIONS 
The Department of Defense is the nation’s largest employer, currently employing 
over two million people: 1.4 million active duty military, 718,000 civilian employees, 
and 1.1 million National Guard and Reserve military (Figure 2). There are over 5000 sites 
or installations where DOD employees work all over the world.  
 
 
Figure 2.  DOD IT infrastructure characteristics (from Information Technology 
(IT) Enterprise Strategy and Roadmap, 2011.).  
The mission of the DOD is to protect the security of the United States of America, 
and all of the employees of the DOD require Common Access Cards (CAC) in order to 
perform their work securely and access working sites securely using the certifications 
stored on the smart cards as a means of PIV authentication. The majority of DOD sites 
today (whether physical access sites or websites on the Internet) require digital 
certification upon logon, which requires the CAC card. The certifications on the CAC 
card are accessed hundreds of times per working day per employee, so with a time 
estimate of 6–8 seconds per access multiplied by ~100 times a day per employee, there is 
a significant amount of time being used on CAC transactions. Currently, employees 
within the DOD use the Microsoft Outlook mail client in order to send digitally signed 
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and encrypted emails to and from one another. This mail client can be accessed through a 
web browser but encrypted and digitally signed documents are not enabled unless a CAC 
reader is also connected to the device in question in order to access the certificates on the 
CAC itself.  
According to IDC (Market Analysis: Worldwide Mobile Enterprise Security 
Software 2012–2016 Forecast and Analysis), mobile identity and access management is 
expected to grow by 27.6 percent between 2010 and 2016 (Effective identity and access 
management in a mobile world, n.d.). There is significant growth in mobile 
communications within the United States, and within the DOD, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Reference (b), 
recognizes mobile technology as a key capability enabler for joint force combat 
operations; secure commercial mobile applications are increasingly viewed as essential to 
innovations and improved mission effectiveness across a wide range of DOD mission 
areas (Takia, 2013). There are at least 11,000 Government Funded Equipment (GFE) 
mobile phones issued within the Marine Corps services alone (FICAM Mobile Pilot 
Solution Case Studies Version 1.0, personal communication, April, 2014). Achieving and 
maintaining the information advantage as a critical element of national power requires the 
concentrated effort of the entire DOD to provide an information environment optimized 
for the warfighter and effective for all echelons, from the tactical edge to the strategic 
core (Information Technology (IT) Enterprise Strategy and Roadmap, 2011).   
“A mobile device… is a portable computing device that: (i) has a small form 
factor such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed to operate 
without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or receive information); (iii) 
possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-
contained power source…but mobile devices lack the integrated smart card readers found 
in laptop and desktop computers and require separate card readers attached to devices to 
provide authentication services from the device” (Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA), Public Law (P.L.) 107–347, 2014). Mobile devices are 
generally too small to integrate smart card readers into the device itself, requiring 
alternative approaches for communicating between the PIV Card and the mobile device 
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(FISMA, Public Law (P.L.) 107–347, 2014). Smart card technology is present in almost 
all mobile devices, either on the SIM card or through another secure element like a 
Secure Digital (SD) card. 
B. DOD PROOF OF CONCEPT  
The DOD has sponsored development of the Open Protocol for Access Control, 
Identification, and Ticketing with privacy (OPACITY), which is a Diffie-Hellman-based 
key exchange protocol to establish secure channels in contactless environments. The 
protocol has been registered as an ISO/IEC 24727–6 authentication protocol and is 
specified in the draft ANSI 504–1 national standard (GICS) (Dagdelen, Fischlin, 
Gagliardoni, Marson, Mittelbach, & Onete, 2013).  It is compliant with the 
recommendation by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the 
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 
Cryptography” publication 800–56Ar2, 2013, as well as the National Security Agency’s 
(NSA) Suite B Cryptography standards. The Opacity software uniquely and securely 
identifies each cardholder over a contactless interface using the PKI certificates, which 
are hard to reproduce. Opacity uses two key exchange protocols: Zero Key Management 
(ZKM) and Full Secrecy (FS). The ZKM protocol only ensures the identity of the 
cardholder and does not require maintaining registered public keys. The FS protocol will 
require mutual authentication and is a secure way to protect both the identities of the 
communicating parties as well as the message in relay itself which is encrypted using 
ECC. OPACITY has been targeted for use in many ways. Some examples of possible 
OPACITY use cases are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  OPACITY USE CASES. (from ACTIVIDENTITY: The Open 
Protocol for Access Control Identification and Ticketing with PrivacY 
For Secure Contactless Transactions and Enabling Logical and 
Physical Access [Powerpoint] (n.d.). Retrieved August 2014. 
OPACITY contains a Secure Authentication Module (SAM) that is similar to the 
Hardware Security Module (HSM) within a smart card (Figure 4). The SAM contains a 
private key and root public keys and helps to establish sessions once the application in 
question has asked for authentication from the smart card. Both the SAM and the smart 
card will generate keys that will be matched and authentication will be granted if the 
match is successful. 
 
 
Figure 4.  OPACITY simple command flow. (after ACTIVIDENTITY: The 
Open Protocol for Access Control Identification and Ticketing with 
PrivacY For Secure Contactless Transactions and Enabling Logical 
and Physical Access [PowerPoint] n.d. Retrieved August 2014.  
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The primary goal of the OPACITY Proof of Concept (POC) at DMDC was to 
demonstrate secure PKI transactions using smart cards over a Near Field Communication 
(NFC) contactless interface. There were also four main objectives working toward this 
goal (HID Professional Services Document NFC Mobile PoC Integration Test Report, 
personal communication, March 31, 2014) 
: 
• To demonstrate the feasibility of securing the NFC contactless interface in 
a mobile environment simply by holding an OPACITY-enabled smartcard 
to the back of the phone—without a Bluetooth smartcard sled reader, a 
connected reader or alternate secure element such as a secure microSD.   
• To demonstrate the business value of OPACITY to enforce the 
Government mobility mandates for mobile devices (alignment with ANSI 
504 / GICS part 1 and FIPS 201–2: Secure Contact interface).  
• To identify the improvements and/or adjustments needed in the 
infrastructure to promote the use of mobile devices by Government 
employees. 
• To assess any technology limitations in order to use existing NFC-enabled 
smart phones to operate with new generations of the CAC. The purpose is 
also to gather requirements for the upcoming generation of cards and 
smart phones to support above use cases  
These objectives fulfilled the directive of the DOD Identify Council to both use 
PKI credentials on the smart card while securing the mobile work environment. Since an 
NFC-enabled mobile device can interact with a PIV Card over its contactless antenna at a 
very close range, the mobile device can use the keys on the PIV Card without a physical 
connection (FISMA, Public Law (P.L.) 107–347). It still uses a two-factor 
challenge/response system that asks for a pin and responds to the request. The technology 
chosen must also incorporate Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKSC) #11 which 
deals with cryptographic tokens (i.e., the certificates existing on the smart card). 
Requirements for the pilot project were outlined in the original scope proof of concept 
document (HID Professional Services Document NFC Mobile PoC Integration Test 
Report, personal communication, March 31, 2014): 
• Requirement 1: The mobile email client shall use the OPACITY protocol 
to authenticate the user and use Secure Messaging to secure the CAC 
contactless interface for PKI transactions 
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• Requirement 2: The PoC solution shall support the email signing and 
email decryption use cases 
• Requirement 3: The email client application should enforce the 
cardholders authentication to the mobile email client using the CAC 
• Requirement 4: The PoC shall be conducted on an external facing 
infrastructure. This intention of this PoC is not only to demonstrate the use 
of the mobile email application using the CAC, but to use the solution in a 
real-world environment to assess real-world obstacles or ease of use. 
Hence, the PoC email infrastructure must be accessible via the NIPRNet 
rather than only within a closed lab environment. 
• Requirement 5: The PoC solution shall support up to 40 participants 
• Requirement 6: The evaluation cards issued to participants shall use 
fictitious user information to avoid exposing any Personally Identifiable 
information 
• Requirement 7: The email transactions shall utilize DISA test certificates. 
The CAC-Like cards will request the ID, PIV authentication, email and 
signing certificates from the DISA test Certificate Authority. 
• Requirement 8: The PoC shall only use CAC-Like test cards encoded with 
the DOD CAC+PIV EP Data Model 
• Requirement 9: The PoC Shall limit the use cases to PKI operations. The 
card surface printing shall clearly identify the card as a sample card for the 
DMDC Mobile NFC Proof of Concept and must not resemble the FIPS 
201–1 card surface requirements. 
• Requirement 10: The PoC Shall limit the use cases to PKI operations. The 
PoC use cases do not encompass the use of the CAC Demographic data or 
biometric data. Therefore, the PoC card personalization must include 
specific test data: 
• Requirement 11: The PoC shall support specific mobile phone devices 
• Requirement 12: The PoC shall support specific card platforms which is 
considered proprietary information and will not be shared in this thesis.  
 
DMDC partners with HID for the PoC cards: creation, pin reset, termination and 
reissue. The cards used in the POC project were generated by HID since the current CAC 
cards at DMDC do not support a specific applet that was still in development and under 
review by NIST. HID partners with Good for Government Technology to provide both a 
commercial secure email client and a mobile device manager (MDM) as the interface 
used to test out the smart card certifications, both for the Good enterprise servers, the 
ActivId application, and the email client. A breakdown of roles and responsibilities per 




Figure 5.  Integration Summary, from HID Professional Services Document NFC 
Mobile PoC Integration Test Report, personal communication, March 
31, 2014 
Good Technology is promoting its enterprise data and device management system 
used to secure access to email through certificate-based authentication 
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). The software provides a 
seamless interface on different device platforms including Android, iOS, and Windows. 
Good Technology supports all legacy smart cards or the users can choose to use a 
MicroSD card within their mobile phones as the primary credential. Following is an 
example of the different features available from Good Technology (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Management and Control Features from Good for Enterprise Data 
Sheet [Brochure]. (n.d). Retrieved August 2014 from 
https://media.good.com/documents/ds-good-for-enterprise.pdf 
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The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) received several Samsung and 
Galaxy phones (Android) from different mobile phone carriers to use in the test pilot. 
Specially configured test CACs and test DOD PKI certificates were used in conjunction 
with the phones to test specific use cases. These test CACs, provided by card 
manufacturers, allowed encrypted PKI transactions over contactless interfaces.  The 
Proof of Concept cards are non-FIPS versions of the next generation of card platforms. 
These DMDC-selected cards support Elliptic Curve Cryptography used by the OPACITY 
protocol and support NFC used to communicate with the mobile device (HID 
Professional Services Document NFC Mobile PoC Integration Test Report, personal 
communication, March 31, 2014). DMDC provided the fictitious data that was used to 
identify the smart cards being used during the testing, plus the test certificates provided 
by DISA. The certificates include: ID certificate, Email Signing Certificate, Email 
Encryption Certificate, and the PIV Authentication Certificate., although only the email 
certificates were tested. Basically, the testers had to hold an OPACITY-enabled smart 
card to the back of the mobile device, authenticate into the MDM, and secure the existing 
email application with PKI certificates on the CAC to digitally sign, encrypt, and decrypt 
email contactlessly (see Figure 7). It was necessary to do this without a connected card 
reader or secure microSD within the mobile device. The transaction between the card and 
the device is encrypted using an ANSI 504 OPACITY ZKM secure channel. This Diffie-
Hellman Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a non-proprietary way to encrypt the contactless 
channel of the CAC.  
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Figure 7.  NFC-Enabled Mobile Phone Used as a Reader (Mobile devices and 
identity applications [Publication] September 2012. Retrieved March 
2015 ) 
DMDC employees were tasked with testing the phones for five specific use cases. 
The use cases consisted of the following: 
• User Authentication  
• Send and receive Signed email, with and without attachments 
• Send and Receive Encrypted email, with and without attachments 
• Send and Receive both Signed/Encrypted email, with and without 
attachments 
• Usability Testing (Loss of NFC Session)  
The user must be able to authenticate to the Good application in five seconds or 
less (a timely manner) by responding to the prompt for credentials with the user’s pin, 
and receiving an acknowledgment that the authentication requirements have been 
satisfied. In order to send a signed and/or encrypted email the user must establish a secure 
session and the application establishes the hashed data to be signed by the user’s email 
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signing key on the PoC card. In order to receive a signed email the process is reversed: 
the application is able to decrypt the provided hash and verify it matches the email 
client’s calculated hash. This process is duplicated for emails that contain attachments. 
The user also should verify that the time taken to sign and/or encrypt an email is a 
reasonable amount of time, within a few seconds. A major part of the usability testing 
concerned the success or failure rate of the NFC connection. Users documented how 
difficult it might have been to determine the correct location of the connection between 
the smart card and the NFC connection, and the success and failure rate of that 
connection especially during specific tasks such as encrypting an email. Users were also 
asked whether or not they might have preferred a protective case that correctly positioned 
the card upon the NFC antenna, however, since the antenna location is in different 
locations for different phones this would be a difficult prospect. An illustration of the 
proper connection area for a Samsung Galaxy 3 is shown in Figure 8. 
  
Figure 8.  Using contactless cards with NFC-enabled devices (HID 
TECHNICAL NOTE Document Version 1.1:  Using Contactless 
Cards with NFC-Enabled Devices, personal communication, March 
2014) 
The OPACITY pilot at DMDC was considered a success. All stakeholders 
involved (DMDC, HID Global, and Good Technologies) worked together on the 
objectives and outcomes and demonstrated effective team participation. All testers 
indicated that the contactless connection when working properly is the most convenient 
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and cost effective way to authenticate to a mobile device. Testers provided valuable 
feedback on the testing experience that can be used to improve the process in the future. 
A timing delay was discovered in a specific card model and the vendor was made aware 
of it in order to make necessary changes. A bug in manufactured NFC readers was also 
discovered and that information was made available to the vendor for correction. Specific 
points gained from testing included: 
• Smart card RF Signal strength needs improvement and different card 
vendors should standardize for consistent RF strength 
• NFC reader signal strength on mobile phones needs improvement as well 
as a standardized position for the NFC connection; addition of smart card 
testing at manufacturer level needs to occur 
• Smart card response time and performance must be improved, ideally 
between 300–500 ms per transaction 
• Smart card vendors should work on non-proprietary solutions that mesh 
with standards being developed; gov’t should identify their needs and 
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IV. CARD TESTING AND ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE 
COMPARISON 
This portion of the paper focuses on the testing of smart cards to compare the key 
generation time for different algorithms. The key generation time is important in terms of 
the OPACITY test pilot because the NFC connection over a mobile phone must be fast 
enough to enable Department of Defense employees to sign and encrypt emails in a 
reasonable amount of time, ideally 3/10–5/10 of a second per transaction. Three different 
types of cards by manufacturer were used which will be identified by Card 1, Card 2, and 
Card 3. Four different types of algorithms were used: SHA, AES, RSA, and ECC. Some 
of the tests focused on key generation, key computation, and key agreement. In addition, 
different key lengths for each algorithm were also used to track the operation time for 
each length. Lastly, each algorithm was tested for three different numbers of iterations in 
order to determine whether the number of iterations increased the time taken to complete 
the specific transaction.  
Three specific operations were tested: compute, key generation, and key 
agreement. Compute simply means performing the standard algorithm identified in each 
test. Key generation is the process of creating a public and private key pair. The 
encryption key is public and the decryption key is private. The key agreement test 
consists of the basic Hellman-Diffie test: two users can exchange keys with one another 
by establishing a shared secret key. The compute test was performed on the Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithms. The key 
generation test was performed on the RSA and ECC algorithms. The key agreement test 
was only performed on the ECC algorithm. 
This particular set of tests was run on a contactless interface (having the smart 
card connect with the smart card reader wirelessly using the RF signal). All of the testing 
was done using a T=1 protocol which means that each APDU transaction has the 
capability to send a command and receive data within one transaction. The time involved 
in setting up the command with just the algorithms was isolated in order to subtract it out 
from the timing of the actual operations being performed on each algorithm. Results were 
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returned in seconds, milliseconds, and microseconds. All results were converted to 
microseconds since it was the smallest common unit of return. The types of operations, 
algorithms, and bit lengths tested are identified in Table 1.  
 





















Table 1.   Operation, algorithm, and bit length testing 
Demonstrating the value of testing was a challenge for several reasons. Different 
capabilities existed on the three different types of cards. Comparisons between all cards 
could not be done since different operations, algorithms, and bit lengths were available 
only on certain cards. First, not all cards could support the same algorithms. For instance, 
Card 2 did not contain the RSA algorithm or the SHA and ECC bit length 384 algorithms 
so the results were empty for that set of tests. Another example: Card 1 came back with 
‘UNKNOWN’ results for the ECC Key Agreement operation which indicates that the test 
failed but left no conclusion as to what might have gone wrong. The cards were tested at 
300, 1000, and 5000 iterations and the results were all similar in scope between the three 
different iterations. In general, the operation timing decreased as the number of iterations 
increased because the command generation time (subtracted from the operation timing) 
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had less of an effect on a higher number of iterations. Figure 9 shows (in cards 1, 2, and 
3) that the operation length decreased with each set of iterations. 
 
Figure 9.  Timing decreases as number of iterations increases 
A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF THREE CARD TYPES 
Each following section will focus on a specific algorithm tested at different bit 
lengths.  Not all bit lengths are supported by all card algorithms.  Charts will show visual 
representation of the results of each test set.   
1. AES Algorithm 
Figure 10 shows the comparison between the three different card types for the 
computation of the AES algorithm tested at bit lengths of 128, 192, and 256. Card 2 took 
significantly more time than Cards 1 and 3. This type of testing is especially beneficial 
for organizations such as DMDC in order to determine which card type will best fulfill 
requirements of specific initiatives. 
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Figure 10.  Comparison of 3 card types with AES compute algorithm 
2. SHA Algorithm 
Figure 11 shows the same type of card comparison but compares the computation 
of the SHA algorithm instead. For the Block 1 and 256 bit lengths, Card 2 takes longer to 
compute the same algorithm. Card 2 does not support the 384 bit length test so no results 
were returned for that test.  
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Figure 11.  Comparison of 3 card types with SHA compute algorithm 
3. ECC Algorithm 
Figure 12 is a comparison of the key generation process on three different types of 
cards using ECC. The bit length of 384 is not supported on Card 2 so that test result is 
missing but card 2 has the slowest performance on all other supported bit lengths. Card 1 
has the fastest performance for all tested bit lengths. 
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Figure 12.  Comparison of key generation of 3 card types with ECC compute 
algorithm 
Figure 13 is a comparison of the key agreement process on three different types of 
cards using ECC. Card 1 did not support this algorithm at all, and Card 2 only supported 
the algorithm for 224 and 256 bit lengths. Card 3 was the only card that supported this 
algorithm at the 384 bit length, so if this level of security was needed for a specific 
process, then this type of card would be the only available card to work with. 
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Figure 13.  Comparison of key agreement. 3 card types with ECC compute 
algorithm 
4. ECC and RSA Algorithm Performance Comparison 
Figure 14 contains the most important results in terms of the pilot project 
identified in this paper. It compares the speed of key generation using the RSA algorithm 
against the speed of key generation using the ECC algorithm at equivalent bit lengths. 
According to data generated by NIST, the performance cost of using the RSA algorithm 
is six times higher than that of using the ECC algorithm at the same bit length. This 
means that in order to provide the same level of security as the ECC algorithm, the RSA 
algorithm would take six times as long to generate keys. This was corroborated by the 
test performed on available cards for this research. Cards 1 and 2 did not support testing 
the RSA algorithm for key generation at 2048 bytes. The only key generation comparison 
that could be made at an equivalent bit length between RSA and ECC with provided card 
materials was using Card 3. It took the RSA algorithm approximately 46 times longer to 








V. RISK AND MITIGATION ANALYSIS FOR MOVE FROM RSA 
TO ECC ALGORITHM 
According to the DOD Mobile Device Strategy, “successful execution…” of an 
implementation plan “relies on the collaboration and cooperation of all DOD components 
and on partnerships with federal, intelligence, academia, and commercial communities,” 
but that it is necessary to keep the DOD workforce “relevant in an era when information 
and cyberspace play a critical role in mission success” (DOD, 2014). A primary goal of 
the Mobile Device Strategy is to “Institute Mobile Device Policies and Standards,” which 
encompasses the usage of commercial products in a timely manner as well as a system 
that can securely manage them in addition to education for mobile device users.   
DOD must establish a mobile device security architecture which includes the 
“Public Key Infrastructure security, access, and identification controls at the network, 
device, and application levels” (DOD, 2014). The cryptographic implementation (ECC 
algorithm) should follow the recommendations of NSA/NIST in all categories. In 
addition, conforming to standards of the Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation (CC), an international standard for computer security assurances, is 
advisable.  
The implementation must be enterprise-wide but must also support executive and 
tactical or battlefield mission critical agendas. Unfortunately, the lengthy certification 
processes required for most United States government makes adoption of any new 
technologies a slow and challenging undertaking. The following standards need to be 
taken into consideration when implementing changes to any government issued card 
process: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 201, FIPS 140), NIST 
Recommendation (i.e., NIST SP800–63–1, SP 800–157). Government IT departments 
will have to configure and manage the new technology in terms of mobile authentication. 
This will require extensive user training and must conform to the existing smart card 
regulations.  
Coordination with third-party vendors is a critical factor. Card vendors must not 
create proprietary solutions but must instead focus on conforming to U.S. government 
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and ANSI standards. Card manufacturers must be able to provide these in the quantity 
desired. Once the new algorithm has been integrated into the smart cards, the smart cards 
will be implemented into the current processes for dispensing cards to users. In addition, 
the administration will have to determine whether or not users can Bring Your Own 
Device (BYOB) or use only Government Funded Equipment (GFE). Limiting devices to 
GFE allows the agency to more closely manage the device and application usage than 
they would be able to for bring your own device (BYOD) [Mobile Pilot Solution Case 
Studies Version 1.0], personal communication, April, 2014].  Either way, training will 
need to be provided in order to use mobile device certificate signing and encryption. This 
training should be done in a general application or demonstration.  
The protection of privacy is a huge initiative within the DOD. The CAC contains 
a variety of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) which must be protected from 
unauthorized access (Preliminary Confidentiality Impact Level Analysis–version 0 6, 
personal communication, April 2014). Therefore, consideration of the protection of this 
information has to be paramount in the implementation of accessing CACs through a 
mobile device. The DOD has applied the assessment model described in NIST SP 800–
122 to determine a Preliminary Confidentiality Impact Level Assessment of the PII and 
linked and linkable data contained in the chip on the PIV card in the context of a 
Contactless Secure Messaging solution. This includes information in the x.509 certificate, 
the Card Holder Unique Identifier, and possibly biometrics data and personal data. The 
biometrics data is especially considered high importance since it is not easily accessed 
elsewhere. This makes the features available on the cards extremely critical—the card 
manufacturers must take responsibility to remove any and all unused features on the card 
in order to avoid possible pathways to manipulate and extract card content. In addition, 
users should be required to have CAC cards contained within radio frequency shields so 
that contactless interference cannot occur.  
One concern that was addressed is the possibility of “sniffing” vulnerabilities 
through the contactless interface, since contactless transactions have not been used before 
but would be required in the mobile scenario. The information available for sniffing on 
the card, which includes attributes such as different name types and email addresses are 
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easily obtained through other means than the CAC card, so are not deemed a significant 
privacy risk. A secure messaging (SM) channel that implements digital signatures, 
enforcing integrity of information, is used to access the objects on the contactless 
interface. SM requires that the card be within a specific distance from the reader in order 
to power the card. Electromagnetic opaque sleeves can also be used to mitigate the risk, 
and the combination of these three factors actually entails less risk than the contact reader 
interface, since contactless transaction times are much shorter than those of a card sitting 
within the reader for an unspecified amount of time. In addition, a pairing code is being 
proposed that would require a six digit pin be entered prior to any certificates being 
accessed on the card. The pairing code would ‘pair’ a reader and a card together which 
would prevent any other rogue devices from ‘skimming’ information off of the card. If a 
pairing code is added to the process then DOD will incur significant additional costs and 
development time to add this feature. These recommendations must be evaluated prior to 
final implementation of CAC mobile access. 
Separate mobile pilots were also executed by the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA), the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). A gap analysis was done as an overview for mobile technology and technical, 
policy, and marketplace gaps were identified. Technical gaps included the control of 
personal information on mobile devices (especially in terms of legal liability), the lack of 
standardization for PIV technologies (especially in terms of security), and the lack of 
available Certificate Authorities (CA) to handle the software certificates needed to access 
mobile devices. Policy gaps included policy questions regarding two-factor 
authentication requirements by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), questions 
of whether the PIV certificates meet requirements for Level of Assurance (LOA) 4 
authentication, and whether or not certificate solutions align with the upcoming NIST SP 
800–157. Marketplace gaps included the lack of mobile device and application 
management solutions (especially for Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) programs), lack 
of federally approved secure mobile device solutions, lack of applications that support the 
use of PIV credentials, and lack of vetting solutions for new and updated application 
vetting. Recommendations were made to mitigate the technical, policy, and marketplace 
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gaps but these would require a concerted effort between government agencies, mobile 
device manufacturers, hardware component developers, service providers, and third-party 
vendors. 
DISA has been incorporating mobility planning in its strategic plans for a few 
years as part of its DOD Mobility Implementation Plan. As of January 31, 2014, DISA 
deployed version 1.0 of the unclassified mobility plan, which supports 1800 mobility 
devices (i.e., iPad, tablets) as well as 80000 BlackBerry phones. The mobility plan itself 
will be deployed in three phases over 2014, with the first phase focusing on policy, the 
second phase focusing on security and service, and the third phase focusing on operations 
and management. There are 16 approved mobile applications with 90 more being vetted 
for use. All of the current tasks being performed are unclassified, but DISA will continue 
to work towards a secure mobile solution to enable DOD workers to perform their jobs. 
Users are being transitioned in according to the priorities set by the commands. DISA 
also created a Mobility website to track and promote all of its mobility documentation 
and policies, which include four primary goals listed in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  Mobility goals, DISA (DISA: DOD MOBILITY PROGRAM, 2012.)  
The DOD Mobility Implementation Plan pinpoints potential issues in regard to 
governance, cost management, and mobile device management. Metrics will be taken on 
mobile device statistics and audits will be performed to ensure the best solutions are 
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being taken. Requirements will be developed for policies including application 
development, accreditation, and certification. A DOD Mobility Program Management 
Office (PMO) is being established to handle all mobility related tasking. The General 
Services Administration (GSA) will be working on a mobile contract that encompasses 
the entire government’s mobility needs. This will include the infrastructure, devices, 
applications, information assurance and any necessary user training. The BYOD option is 
not approved at this time but will continue to be evaluated for future use. Classified 
access will be authorized over encrypted websites only but not through contactless CAC 
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